“A recipe for thought”. •. •. Fred Dretske a sketch of a “naturalistic” account of intentional mental states (a “psychosemantics”). “Thought may be intentional. View Notes – dretske from PHIL at University Of Arizona. Fred Dretske A recipe for thought Phil/Psyc Fall How do you build a thinking thing?. A question about Dretske’s idea that intentionality can be located in things outside of the mind — such as compasses, thermometers, and even.
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Are intentional mental states simply physical states? | janetthomas
The philosopher Fred Dretske investigated the claims of the late philosopher Roderick Chisholm who argued that intentional states could only be mental states. This claim was derived from the thesis of the nineteenth century philosopher Franz Brentano in his book Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint. This essay will explore the claims made by Chisholm and Dretske and ascertain the validity of their arguments as to whether the all the contents of the mind are physical or mental states.
A feature of mental states is thouvht content. yhought
For example, when I see a cat, I am perceptually aware of that cat, or when I believe that it is going to rain, my belief represents a state of the weather.
My perception of the cat may be precise or imprecise, my belief that it is going to rain may be accurate or inaccurate and my desire to be loved may be satisfied or unsatisfied.
For example, the statement I am thinking about fire-breathing dragons simply means that my thoughts are directed toward such dragons, recipf though they do not physically exist. He also contended that it is possible for two different states to be directed towards the same object and only psychological phenomena had this object directedness Chalmersp.
Chisholm accounts for the intentionality of thoughts through language, semantics, and mental expectation. He asserts that all of these demonstrate psychological intentionality and cannot be explained in non-psychological, nonintentional terms Chalmersrecjpe.
For Chisholm intentionality cannot be naturalized because no such psychological fact can be drefske with a physical fact. However, Chisholm statesp. To establish his theory that intentionality is already naturalized, Dretskyp.
Talk of the use of a compass gives it an intensional context. Therefore, we have intentional phenomena the compass with an intensional context its use or purpose and that this intensionality is as much a part of the intentional phenomena as its original intentionality. For Dretskep. Examples that he gives are dark clouds, tree recioe, or smoke.
However, intentional phenomena like the compass, although able to misrepresent the information it was designed to deliver, is reliant on us to be able to do it.
We are the ones whose purposes and attitudes determine the success or failure of such physical phenomena. It is the derived power of such objects recipf misrepresent that Rrecipep.
Through his recipe for thought, Dretske is asserting a purely physicalist ontology of the mind. For Dretske Jacobinformation exhibits some degree of intentionality and is able to show both the intentionality of beliefs as well as its derived intentionality of an utterance that can misrepresent such information. With his assessment of intentional inexistence, Brentano Byrne n.
Fred Dretske, A Recipe for Thought – PhilPapers
Intentionality must also be plainly distinguished from intensionality because mental states are not intensional, only sentences are Byrne n.
A sentence can be intentional yet be completely separate from intentionality and also sentences that report mental states need not be intensional Byrne n. For Dretske to maintain that intentionality can be physically or naturalistically reduced he distinguishes between original or intrinsic intentionality and derived intensionality.
Dretske also maintains a causal theory of intentionality such that mental states represent something, like tree rings represent something, and argues that the intentionality of mental states can be reduced to their evolutionary biological function. This claim can be amended to original intentionality is sufficient for mentality, thereby making the claim have some chance of validity Byrne n.
With the claim that intentionality is necessary for mentality it can be countered with the claim that sensations are mental states that are non-intentional Byrne n. However, even Dretske asserts that bodily sensations are mental perceptions and therefore are intentional Byrne n.
They have no physical determining factor. If they had a physical determining factor they would not be a mental state because they would be derived from physical perceptions. When I am thinking about something that does not exist, it has no place in the physical world. Like shadows on the wall that make one believe that there is a monster, they are a particular feature of our imagination. The thoughts about that monster are further intentional states, however the language that the subject speaks about the monster or the painting that the subject does of the monster are not.
Mental states can be differentiated and separated from physical states because of their ability to misrepresent and also to change the information given to them through bodily sensations.
A Recipe for Thought
National Health Service and other mental illnesses that have dire physical effects are examples of such intentional mental states. An Encyclopediaed. Chalmers, D J ed.
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